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Abstract
The paper studies the effidency of economic networks and the stability
oflinks when players fieely choose to form or cut them for $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{u}}$ self-interests.
$\mathrm{A}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{u}\Phi$ it is desirable that a network is both effident and stable, these
two objectives are oflen incompatible. hnposing reasonable $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{q}\iota\dot{\mathrm{u}}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{s}$
on the distributive rule, we will $\dot{\Re}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ conditions under which this conflict is
avoided.
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1. Introduction
The paper studies the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{y}$ of economic networks and the stabihty
of links when players fieely choose to form or cut them for their self-interests.
We $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{j}\mathbb{I}$ show that some of the efficient networks are unstable and some of
the stable networks are ineffident. However we can $\dot{g}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ reasonable
suffident conditions under whi& these two requirements are compatible in
fairly general settinae. We will also show that in some typical networks the
conflict can be resolved by imposing reasonable conditions on parameters
characterizing the networks.
Our fiamework is very similar to that in Ja&son and Wohnsky (1996)
Emphasis is laid on the compahbihty of $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{y}$ and stabihty ofnetworks.
. We argue that $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{y}$ results because players’ net benefit fiom the
formation of links conflicts with the social benefit. Other related studies
indude Aumann andMyerson (1988), Myerson (1977) and Qin (1996).
Some recent studies, induding Bolton and $\mathrm{D}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}\iota’ \mathrm{t}\dot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$(1994), Radner
(1992) and Hendrioe , $\mathrm{P}\mathrm{i}\iota:\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}$ and Tan (1995), aim at erlaining
structural features of networks. Other studies, induding Radner (1993),
Sobel (1992), Zamir, Kamien and Tauman(1990), highlight aspects of
infomation processing. Economides $(1996\mathrm{a},\mathrm{b})$ and Economides and White
(1994) relate the compatibihty and the networks that rely on it vith the
vertically related industries and discuss policy issues arising in modern
economies.
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2. Key Concepts and Notations
Let $N= \oint I,\mathit{2},\ldots,nj$ be the set of players. The network relations among
them are represented by $\Psi^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{s}}$ whose nodes are identified with the players
and whose arcs indicate the pairwise relations.
The $\Re \mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}$ representing the set of all subsets of $N$ of size 2 will be
called the complete $\Psi^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}}$ and denoted $g^{N}$ It will also be referred to as a
point-to-point network. The subset of $N$ containing $i$ and $j$ will be
denoted as $ij$. $ij\in g$ means that $i$ and $j$ are directly connected.
We let $g+ij$ denote the graph obtained by adding link $ij$ to $g$ and
g-ij denote the graph obtained by deleting link $ij$ fiom $g$.
A sequence of direct connections $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathbb{I}$ be called a $p\mathrm{a}tf_{\mathrm{J}}$ . A pair ofnodes $i$
and $j$ are connected if there is a path between $i$ and $j$. The nodes in
$g$ which are $\infty \mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ by a path, together with the corresponding aroe, form
a component of $g$. The set ofcomponents of $g$ will be denoted $C(g)$ . A
component of a graph will called a star or a $\mathrm{A}\mathrm{u}b$-spoke network if $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ edges
are hnked to one central edge.
Let $G$ be the set of an subsets (subgraphs) of $g^{N}$ repefformance
of the graph $g$ will be captured by a real valued ffinchon $v$ : $Garrow R$ , oflen
referred to as the sodal utihty fimction or the valuation fimction. $\mathrm{h}$ some
applications the value will be an aggregate of individual utihties or
productions and may be erressed as $v(g)=\Sigma_{i}u_{i}(g)$ for $g\in G$ . The set of $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$
social utihty fimctions $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{H}$ be denoted V. Allocation rule
$\mathrm{Y}$ : Gx $\mathrm{V}arrow R^{\hslash}$
describes how the value assodated with ea&network are distributed to the
individual players. $\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)$ is the payoff to player $i$ from graph $g$
under the value function $\mathrm{v}$. A simple example of the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ Me is the
$eq\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}l$ distlibution $rde$ ( $\overline{\mathrm{Y}_{i}}=v(g)/n$ for all z) wbich splits the value of the
game $v(g)$ equally among the players. A graph $g\in G$ is strongly
efficient if $v(g)\geq v(g)$ for all $g^{1}\in G$ . The term strong efficiency indicates
that it refers to the total value rather than Parehan notion.
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3. Some Examples and Preliminary Remarks
We will $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}s$cuss whether a network is efficient fiom a social viewpoint
andwhi&hnks are Rely to be formed. It is easy to find examples in whi&
these two objechves are compatible.
mical examples indude the case of a good young couple in love and
links among several ffiendly countries. $\mathrm{h}$ these cases the benefit fiom the
connections $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{U}$ compensates for the cost of the formation oflinks. $\mathrm{h}$ the
opposite case where the cost is high compared to the benefit, no link will be
fomed and this will be socially desirable also.
But there are many cases in whi&the $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{y}$ and stabihty of
networks are incompatible. The basic reason for this is that the individual
motive to form or remove links wiffi others may deviate fiom the social
objective. We will discuss that su&cases are very typical.
Next two example shows that adding alink may decrease the total
utihty of the society (even in Parehan sense), even if the cost offormation
ofnetwork is zero and individuals act so as to maximize their uffities (cf.
Garcia, $\mathrm{C}.\mathrm{B}$ . and W. I. $\mathrm{Z}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}$ ]$1$ (1981)$)$ .
buppose there are 3 (thousands) commuters fiom suburb A to $\mathrm{c}\mathrm{i}\eta \mathrm{C}$ and
2 (thousands) commuters fiom subuib $\mathrm{B}$ to city C. It takes 30 minutes to
go from A to $\mathrm{C}$ , but because ofbad road condition, 1 hour is required to go
fiom $\mathrm{B}$ to C.
(Fig. la about here)
(Fig. lb about here)
Because the travel fiom $\mathrm{B}$ to $\mathrm{C}$ is slow, it may app$e$ar to be desirable to
build a new road fiom $\mathrm{B}$ to A. Let $\eta$ (resp. $n_{2}$ ) denote the number ofthe
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residents ofsuburb $\mathrm{B}$ following the route AC (resp. $\mathrm{B}\mathrm{C}$). The cost fimction$s$




The case $n_{1}=0$ and $n_{2}=0(C_{A}=30,C_{B}=60)$ describes the cost ffinctions
before the construchon of the route.
The equihbrium condition
$60=50+2n_{2}$
gives $n_{2}=5$ and $C_{A}=35,$ $C_{B}=60$ . Hence no one is better off and some
one is worse offby the construchon ofthe route.




(Fig. $2\mathrm{b}$ about here)
Fig. $2\mathrm{a}$ shows the relevant network and the $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}s$ociate cost fimctions
whi&depend on the numbers of travelers. Assume that 6 people must travel
A to D. In equihbrium, hours required for $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the route A BD and
route A $\mathrm{C}\mathrm{D}$ must be the $s\mathrm{a}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}$ . Hence, letting $n$ denote the number of
the people $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ the first route we have
$11n+50=11(6-n)+50$ ,
whi&yields $n=3$ . It takes 30 minutes fiom A to $\mathrm{B}$ and 53 minutes from
A to C. The total required hours are 83 minutes in both routes.
Let us now add a link fiom $\mathrm{B}$ to $\mathrm{C}$ whi& yields the equihbrium
condihons.
$10n_{1}+n_{5}+10=n_{3}+50$ (hours fiom A to C)
$n_{2}+50=10n_{4}+n_{5}+10$ (hours fiom $\mathrm{B}$ to D)
$n_{1}=n_{2}+n_{5}$ Cpopulation at B)
$n_{2}+n_{4}=6$ $\Phi \mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ at D)
$n_{1}+n_{3}=6$ $\mathfrak{G}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{P}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ at A)
These equation$s$ yield $n_{1}=4,$ $n_{2}=2,$ $n_{3}=2,$ $n_{4}=4,$ $n_{5}=2$ , and the travel
&om A to $\mathrm{D}$ requires 92 minutes for any route.
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$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$ (Two SidedMatching)
There are finite disjoint sets of agents, $M=(m_{1},\ldots,m_{n})$ and $W=(w_{1},\ldots,w_{\hslash})$ .
Each agent $m_{i}\in M$ owns $a_{i}$ . units of the first resource and ea&agent
$w_{i}\in M$ owns $b_{i}$ units of the second resource. We assume that
$a_{1}<a_{2}<\ldots<a_{n}$ and the $b_{1}<b_{2}<..<b_{\hslash}$ .
In the marriage model, $M$ is the set of men and $W$ is the set of
women and $a_{i}$ and $b_{j}$ $\mathrm{e}_{\Phi}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}s\mathrm{s}$ the amounts of some $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}$ talents
they have. Alternatively, we may assume that $M$ and $W$ are the sets of
agents with two kinds of re$s$ources whi&could be used to produce a
homogeneou$s$ product.
Each member of $M$ is mat&ed only to one member of $W$ and the
total product of the whole matching is given by
$u(g)=\Sigma_{j}f(a_{i},b_{j(i)})$
where $j(i)$ is the agent in $W$ who is matched to agent $i$ in $M$.
In general the maximum of the total product may be attained when a
man with high talent is matched wiffi a woman oflow talent. For example,
let $n=2$ and $a_{1}=1,$ $a_{2}=2,$ $b_{1}=1$ , and $b_{2}=2$ , and production ffinction be
defined by $f(\mathrm{L}1)=1$ , $f(2,2)=4$ , $f(1,2)=f(2,1)=3$ . Then we have
$f(1,2)+f(\mathrm{Z}1)>f(\mathrm{L}1)+f(2,2)$ , as daimed.
This mat&ing is considered to be very unstable because the man and the
woman with hig talents can improve upon the $0\dot{\mathrm{n}}\dot{y}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ position, if we
assume e.g. the equal distribution rule. Thi$s$ conflict can be resolved in the
case where the production .mction satisfies supermodularity as defined
below.
We$\cdot$ say that a real valued fimction $u(a,b)$ is $s$upermodular if $a^{\mathrm{I}}<a$ ,
$b^{\mathrm{t}}<b$ imphes that
$u(a^{\mathrm{I}},b^{1})+u(a,b)>u(d,b)+u(a,b^{1})$ .
Hence the supemodularity $f$ of implies that if $a_{1}<a_{2}$ and $b_{1}<b_{2}$ then
$f(a_{1},\mathrm{h})+f(a_{2},b_{2})>f(a_{1},b_{2})+f(a_{2},b_{1})$. Using this relation repeatedly, we see
that the marimum of the total product is attained when $j(i)=i$ , and the
maximal value is $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ by $u^{*}(g)\approx\Sigma_{j}f(a_{i},b_{i})$ . This matching is considered
to be stable under the equal distribution ffie in the sense that no one is
$\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}]\mathrm{h}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{o}$ form a new link. This condusion $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}$]$1$ be examined in more detail
in the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ sections.
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4. Conditions on Stability and Allocation Rules
To describe whi&networks are likely to aris $\mathrm{e}$, we need to introduce a
notion of stabihty and $s$ome additional concepts. We $s$ ay that $\Psi^{\mathrm{a}}\mathrm{P}^{\mathrm{h}g}$ is
$p\mathrm{a}ir\mathfrak{n}\dot{a}se$ stable with respect to the valuation fimction $v$ and the
distribuhon ffie $\mathrm{Y}$ if
(i) for all $ij\in g$ $\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)\geq \mathrm{Y}_{i}(g-ij,v)$ and $\mathrm{Y}_{j}(g,v)\geq \mathrm{Y}_{j}(g-ij,v)$
and
(\"u) for all $ij\not\in g$ if $\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)<\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g+ij,v)$ then $\mathrm{Y}_{j}(g,v)>\mathrm{Y}_{j}(g+ij,v)$ .
We say that $g$ improves upon $g^{1}$ with respect to $v$ and $\mathrm{Y}$ if
$\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)\geq \mathrm{Y}_{i}(g^{\dagger},v)$ , for all $i\in S$
and $\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)>\mathrm{Y}_{\mathrm{i}}(g,v)$ , for some $i\in S$ .
$g$ is $co\mathrm{a}$litiona$lly\epsilon t\mathrm{a}bel(CS)$ if there is no $g^{1}\in g^{N}$ and the set $S$ of
players joined by the graph $g^{1}$ whi&improve upon $g$.
Let $\pi$ be a permutation on the $s$ et of players $N$. We define $g^{\pi}$
as $g^{\pi}\approx\{ij|i\approx\pi(k),j=\pi(l),H\in g\}$ andlet $v^{\pi}(g^{\mathrm{J}t})=v(g)$ .
DEFNNION The allocation rule $\mathrm{Y}$ is $\mathrm{a}I\mathit{1}onflno$us if, for any
permutahon of $\pi,$ $\mathrm{Y}_{\pi(l)}(g^{\pi},v^{\pi})=\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)$ .
Thi$s$ means that the distribution $\mathrm{n}4\mathrm{e}$ depends only on the architectural
form of the graph and not on the naming ofplayers.
DEFMTTION An allocation ffie $\mathrm{Y}$ is balanced (or feasible) if
$\Sigma_{i}\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)=v(g)$ for all $\mathrm{v}$ and $g$.
DEFNNION A hnk $\iota j$ is $Cl\dot{\mathrm{z}}tical$ to the graph $g$ if g-ij has more
components than $g$ or ifit is hnked only to $j$ under $g$.
Recall that we defined $C(g)$ to be the set of components of $g$. We




A value fimction $\mathrm{v}$ is component additive if
We also $\dot{\Re}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}$ :
$\mathrm{D}\mathrm{E}\mathrm{F}\mathbb{N}\mathrm{R}\mathrm{O}\mathrm{N}$ An allocation ffie $\mathrm{Y}$ satisfies $eq\mathrm{u}\mathrm{a}\mathit{1}$ bargainig power
(EBP) iffor all $\mathrm{v},$ $g$ and $ij\in g$
$\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g,v)-\mathrm{Y}_{i}(g-\iota j.,v)=\mathrm{Y}_{j}(gv)-\mathrm{Y}_{j}(g-ij,v)$
The basic reason for the incompatibihty of effidency and pairwise
stabihty is that, whereas pairwise stabihty is attained only through the
adjustments of the private benefits of the directly connected of players, the
sodal objective conoerns with the benefit of the whole network. In
particular, when a critical hnk $ij$ (such a $A_{0}B_{0}$ in Fig.$4\mathrm{b}$) is severed for
private benefit$s$ , other players will be separated and may incur a huge loss,
resulting in the decrease in the social utffity.
The $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ example, whi&is due to Ja&son and Wolinsky (1996)
shows $\mathrm{e}_{\Phi}1\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ the ranges of $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{r}\check{\mathrm{a}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{s}$ in whi&efficiency and pairwise
stabihty are compatible.
Connechons Model (3 players symmetric case)
We assume that players directly communicate with those whom they
are liked. In the symmetric case we consider, the intrinsic value of the
bect communication is $w$ and that of the indirect communication is (for
simplicity) $w^{2}$ We also assume that the cost ofmaintaining the bect hnk
is $c$ (with $w>c$ ) for each player.
Except for the trivial case where no link is fomed, there are three
representative cases.
(Fig.3 about here)
We will assume that the $\mathrm{a}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{l}1e$ satisfies equal bargaining
power.
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case (i) When only one hnk is fomed as in Figure 1, ea&of the 2 players
who are bectly hnked enjoys the utihty of $\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{1})=\mathrm{Y}_{2}(g_{1})=w-c$ , and
$\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{1})\approx 0$ . Hence the social uffity ofthe graph is $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$by $v(g_{1})\approx 2(w-c)$ ,
case (ii) Figure 2 represents the case of a star. The center is directly
linked to the other players and the other players are directly hnked to the
center and inbectly to the $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{M}\mathrm{d}$ player. Hence the social uffity is given by
$v(g_{2})=4w+2w^{2}-4c$ .
We have $\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{\mathit{2}}-23)=\mathrm{Y}_{2}(g_{2}-23)=w-c$ and $\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{-}, -23)=0$ . On the
other hand, $\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{2}-12)=0$ and $\mathrm{Y}_{2}(g_{2}-12)=\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{2}-12)=w-c$ . Also fiom
the equal bargaining power, we have $\mathrm{Y}_{\mathit{2}}(g_{\mathit{2}})-(w-c)=\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{2})-0=\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g)-0$ .
Since $v(g_{2})\approx \mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{2})+\mathrm{Y}_{2}(g_{2})+\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{\mathit{2}})=4w+2w^{2}-4c$ , we have
$\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{2})=\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{2})=w+(2/3)w^{2}-c$ and $\mathrm{Y}_{2}(g_{2})=2w+(2/3)w^{2}$
case (iii) Figure 3 represents the case of the complete graph (or a $\dot{\alpha}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{e}$ in
the $\mathrm{p}\mathrm{r}e\mathrm{s}e\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}$ case). Each player is directly linked to others, henoe we have
$\mathrm{Y}_{1}(g_{3})=\mathrm{Y}_{\mathit{2}}(g_{3})=\mathrm{Y}_{3}(g_{3})=2(w-c)$ and $v(g_{3})=6(w-c)$ .
Graph $g_{2}$ is stable if no benefit is obtained fiom removing any of the
links. It is shown that in the range $w-2w^{2}/3<c<w$ the strongy
effident network $g_{-}$, is uniquely stable, but in the range
$w-2w^{2}<c<w-2w^{2}/3$ the inefficient network $g_{3}$ is the only stable one.
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5 Some General Results
In thi$s$ section we will bring together some of the salient re$s$ult$s$ on the
stabihty of networks and $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}_{\Psi}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ and discuss the implications of related
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}s$earch work stated in somewhat different settings.
Theorem 1 of Jack$s$on andWolinsky (1996) $s\mathrm{a}\mathrm{y}s$ that
$\mathrm{J}1$ $n\geq 3$ , then there is no allocation $\mathrm{n}4\mathrm{e}$ $\mathrm{Y}$ which is anonymous and
component balanced and su&that for each $r$ at least one strongy
efficient graph is pairwise stable.
However, the conflict between efficiency and stabihty can be avoided if
we assume either a spedal nature of distribution ffies or restrict the
$\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}$ dass of graphs. For example, we know the $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}$ (see,
Theorem 3 ofJackson andWobsky (1996)$)$ :
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{n}2$
Equal $dist_{l}\mathrm{i}$bution rule $(\overline{\mathrm{Y}_{i}}(g,v)=v(g)/n$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}$ $i$ ) is an anonymous
and pairwise stable network.
This allocation ffie is not very attractive because it is not sensitive to
the changes in the $s\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\cdot \mathrm{o}\mathrm{f}$network and is not even individual rational in
general. There are distributive rules which $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\Phi$ stabihty and other
desixable properties for a broad class of graphs, as we show below.
Let $N= \oint \mathit{1},\mathit{2},\ldots,nj$ and $(N,u)$ be a $N$-person gam$e$ in the cofiitional
form (characteristic ffinction $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{m}$). We say that gam$e$ $(N,u)$ is
superadditive if
(1) $u(S\cup T)\geq u(S)+u(T)$ for all $S,$ $T\subset N$ such that $S\cap T=\emptyset$ .
We al$s\mathrm{o}s$ay that game $(N,\mathrm{u})$ is convex, if for each $i\in N$ and
$S\subset T\subset N-\{\iota\}$ ,
(2) $u(S\cup\{\iota\})-u(S)\leq u(T\cup\{i\})-u(T)$ .
This means that the contribution of each player $i$ in a $s$ et is not smaller
than that in its subset. This condition is known to be equivalent to
(3) $u(S\mathrm{U}T)+u(S\cap T)\geq u(S)+u(T)$ for all $S,$ $T\subset N$
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(see, $\mathrm{I}\ \ddot{\mathrm{n}}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{i}$ (1983) or Driessen (1988)). Thi$ss$et fimction is also referred to
as supermodular. Hence so far as $u(\phi)=0$ , any convex game is
superadditive.
When a $\Psi^{\mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}}$ $g$ and value fimction $v(g)$ are $\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$, a cooperative
game in the coalitional form can be defined in a natural way. For each
subset $S$ of $N$, the coalihonal gam$e$ is defin$e\mathrm{d}$ as
(4) $U_{\nu.g}(S)=v(g|S)$
where $g|S=$ {$ij\in g$ : $i\in S$ and $j\in S$}.
This erresses the characteristic fimction of the $0\dot{\mathrm{n}}\dot{y}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{l}$ game whi&would
result ifwe $\mathrm{r}e\mathrm{q}u\mathrm{j}x\dot{\mathrm{e}}$ that players can only cooperate along links in $g$.
For a paph whi&is not fully connected, let $C(g)$ be the set of
components of $g$. Then under the $\mathrm{a}ss$umption ofcomponent additivity, the
above characteristic funchon may be expressed as
(5) $U_{\nu.g}(S)=\Sigma_{h\in C(g|S)}v(h)$ .
It $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}s$ily $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{s}$ that if the &aracteristic ffinction satisfies $v(\phi)=0$
and superadditity then $v(\mathrm{T})\geq v(S)$ for $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}S\subset \mathrm{T}$ . This implies the
$\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathbb{I}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\epsilon$ :
lt the characteristic fimction (4) is superadditive then the complete
graph $g^{N}$ is strongly efficient.
It is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}$]$\mathrm{i}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ ffheorem 4 of Jackson andWolinsky (1996)$)$ that
$\mathrm{u}$ value hmction $\gamma$ is component additive, then the lmique $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$
nd$e$ $Y$ whi& satisfies component balance and EBP is the Shapley value
$(^{\star}1)$ of the game defined by the characteristic $\mathrm{f}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}!\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}(4)$ .
The proof rehes on the results in cooperative game theory (see,
Myerson$(1977))$ and uses the abov$e$ definihon of the characteristic ffinction.
The solution described in Proposition 4 is also refened to as the Myerson
value.
No $e_{\mathfrak{W}}1\mathrm{i}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{t}$ stalement is made on the stabihty of networks in
$\mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{o}s\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\langle 3$). But based on Propositions 3 and 4, we can establish a
stabihty $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}s\mathrm{u}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{t}$ :
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If the value fimction $r$ is component additive and $\mathrm{a}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}$ ffie $Y$
(which reduces to the Shapley value) $\mathrm{s}$atisfies component balance and EBP
and if, for each fixed $g$, the assodated &aracteristic ffinction (4) is
superadditive then the $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{U}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ efficient graph is pairwise stable.
For a proof we note, as Myerson(1977) showed $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{i}\dot{\alpha}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{y}$ in the proof of his
Theorem, that if the &aracteristic fimction (4) is superadditive then EBP
nde is pairwis$e$ stable. Proposition 3 then completes the proof.
In a different context, $\not\in \mathrm{n}$ (1994), utihzing a result of a potential $(^{*}2)$ game
(see, Monderer and Shapley (1996)), established an important stabihty
result. He considered a game of coalition formation in which a strategy for
a player $i$ is a set of players whom $i$ nishes to form hnks and a link
between a pair of players is actually formed if both players wish to fom it.
A payoffffincUon is defined as the allocation rule in our model.
A $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}e\dot{\mathrm{g}}\mathrm{c}$ form game with a potential has a learning property. This
means that network forming processes converges to equihbria of the game
and the stable equihbria marimizes the potential. The main stabihty
results of Qin (1994) may be restated as in the fouoning propositions.
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT} \mathrm{P}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{i}$
TheMyerson value is feasible and the cooperation formation game has a
Dotential.
it the payoff of the coalitional game is defined by the &aracteristic
fimction (4) then the proces $s$ of foming hnks with others result in the
attainment offull cooperation (complete $\Re \mathrm{a}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{h}$ $g^{N}$ in our cont$e\mathrm{x}\mathrm{t}$).
It is known that if the game is convex then the core is not empty and the
Shapley value is in the core (See, I&\"ushi (1983) or Driessen (1988)). This
implies that coalitional stabihty holds in this case.
The attainment of the Shapley value rehes on the assumption of equal
bargaining power. If we drop this assumption, similar stabihty re$s$ults
can be obtained for many solution concepts of the cooperative gam$e$ such as
the kernel, the nudeolus, the bargaining $s$ et and $\tau$ -value (see, Tijs(1987) or
Driessen$(1988))$ , once we know the axioms whi&characterize the solutions
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and know that th$e$ solution is in the core. Thus coahtional stabihty can
be attained for many distribution ffies. Superadditivity of a game is a
$s$trong assumption in analyzing the entry problem of modern industries,
where firm$s$ have large fixed co$s\mathrm{t}s$ and sodal optimality requires to restrict
the entry of firm$s$ . Convexity of the game (the super modularity of the




$\mathrm{h}$ many situations effidency and stabihty ofnetworks are incompatible.
We argued that this is because new links bring about extemality whi&is
not taken into account as benefits ofthe individual players.
These two objectives are compatible if the $\mathrm{d}\mathrm{i}$stribution ffie satisfies
equal bargaining power and the game is superadditive. A stronger
requirement than the latter is the supemodularity or convexity of game,
which gurantees stronger coalitional stabihty under altemative distribution
rules. Supermoduality of the numeric$a1$ ffinction as defined in example 3
serves for a similar purpose.
$\mathrm{O}u\mathrm{r}$ analysis in this paper has been conducted in a very abstract setting,
mith no $\mathrm{a}ss$ymmetries among players. $\mathrm{h}$ fact to $e_{\Psi}1\mathrm{a}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}$ the emergence of
a star or complete network was one of our&ief objectives. $\mathrm{h}$ industries
$s$u&as telephone and railroad, geogaphical conditions require some $\mathrm{s}\mathrm{p}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathfrak{a}}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{c}$
network structure$ss$uch as one$s$ with stars. We hop$e$ to discus $s$ these
problems and policy issues in alater research.
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Footnote
(1) Th$e$ Shapley value of the characteristic ffinchon $\mathrm{g}a\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}(N,v)$ , denoted
$\phi(v)=(\phi_{1}(v\}\ldots,\phi_{\hslash}(v))$ , is $\dot{\Re}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{n}$ by
$\phi_{i}(v)=\mathrm{Z}_{S}A(s\mathrm{X}v(S)-v(S-\{\iota\})$ wiffi $A(S)=((s-1)!(n-s)!)/n!$ ,
where $s$ is the number ofplayers in $S$ and the above summation is over ai
$S$ whi&contain $i$ .
(2) A potential for $a$ $s\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{e}\dot{\mathrm{a}}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{m}$ game is a fimction whi&maps $s$trategy
proffies into real numbers (in the present context the action offorming links)
su&that, when $a$ player deviates the&ange in the payoff equak the&ange
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$n_{1}=4,$ $n_{2}=2,$ $n_{3}=2,$ $n_{4}=4,$ $n_{5}=2$
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